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This paper sets forth the foundations for a transactional approach for the 
performance of arbitrage in foreign exchange markets. Firstly, we review 
both the standard model of financial arbitrage and the so-called 
covered-interest arbitrage environment, and we also lay bare striking 
shortcomings in these points of view, mainly grounded on a wide- ranging 
empirical evidence. Next, we move on to what we have labeled in 
previous research working papers a transactional algebra, from which we 
expand on its main tools of analysis, namely differential rates, residual 
information sets, arbitrage gaps and transaction costs functions. 
Afterwards, we establish and prove the minimal conditions under which a 
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Before the 70s, current practice and standard books on International 
Finance had been resorting to a very simple and intuitive framework of 
analysis to deal with foreign exchange arbitrage.  
 
However, as the 70s evolved, many academics and practitioners were 
feeling at variance with mainstream opinions and started not only 
pursuing different points of view but also shaping a new toolbox that 
included transaction costs, comparative economics, conflicts of interests, 
the so-called institutional approach, asymmetric information problems 
and even corporate governance issues. 
 
In this paper, I want to review the old model of foreign currency arbitrage, 
and to also make a humble contribution to its expansion and upgrading 
through the notion of transactional algebras.  
 
To begin with, I introduce the standard model of financial arbitrage, 
which will be followed by the so-called covered interest arbitrage, still 
widely used to teach and discuss foreign exchange key points arising in 
trade and MBAs’ syllabuses. The description of both standpoints will also 
include an outline of their shortcomings.   
 
Afterwards, I will introduce a my own standpoint, which derives from the 
frame of mind that has been in construction since the 70s. To attain our 
goals, the substantive notions of arbitrage gap, differential rates of return, 
residual information sets, and transactional algebras are laid bare to 
reshape the covered interest arbitrage into a sensible picture that entails 
market institutions and frictions, ultimately leading to the core task of 
intermediaries: the brokerage of asymmetric information2 by means of a 
set of minimal conditions to be met so as to grant a successful arbitrage 
within transactional algebras.  
 
Summing up, a non standard approach to arbitrage in International 
Finance is the central claim of this paper. It certainly furthers our previous 
research work3 and takes advantage of an outstanding job done by 
distinguished scholars who are going to be referred in due course. 
 
 
                                                 
2 As far as our knowledge, the expression “brokerage of asymmetric information” was 
firstly coined and fully developed in Apreda (2001). 
3 See Apreda (2004, 2003, 2001a, 2001b, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c).    3 
1. THE STANDARD FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE MODEL 
 
A middle-of-the-road intuition about what is meant by arbitrage is usually 
framed this way: “You buy cheap, hold on4, and then sell to reap the 
profit arising from the gap in both prices.” We could not deny that for 
some currently round-off transactions this stands up well as a suitable 
explanation. Moreover, such way of dealing with this issue seems 
misleading, to say the least, since from many transactions we are not able 
to get any profit5, in spite of a stark difference in prices. Even worse, when 
we define transactions that involve buying firstly and selling later, we 
leave out of the picture the reversal situation, in which we set up good 
arbitrage processes by selling firstly and repurchasing the good later at a 
lower price. That is why the standard viewpoint of financial arbitrage calls 




Financial Arbitrage is a decision-making process whose main features are: 
 
i)    the trade of a financial asset g1, at an expected moment t1  and in 
a certain market m1, at the value  V(g1; m1; t1 ) ; 
 
ii)    the trade of a financial asset g27, at an expected moment t2  and in 
a certain market  m2, at the value V (g2; m2; t2 ), with t 1  £ £  t 2  ;  
 
iii)    making a profit from round-off transactions with g1 and g2 , either 
the long-short or the short-long types, that is to say, the payoff 
functions  P P( . ) become positive: 
 
 
P P(long-short)     =    V (g2; m2; t2 ; s )   - -   V(g1; m1; t1 ; l )   >   0 
 
P P(short-long)     =    V (g1; m1; t1 ; s )   - -   V(g2; m2; t2 ; l )   >   0 
 
iv)    no investment is required for bringing both transactions to 
completion;  
                                                 
4 If the span of the holding period were very small, then the dealer would usually carry 
out an “spatial arbitrage”, whereas the longer the span the more “temporal” the 
arbitrage becomes.   
5 This is attributable to the costs of running a transactional algebra, an expansion of 
which the reader will find in section 3.  
6 A perspective that stems from Microeconomics can be found in Varian (1987). 
7 It is frequent in practice that g1  = g2; otherwise, close substitutes match the deal. 
Spatial-like types of arbitrage ask for m1 = m2, as well.    4 
v)    risks of rounding off both transactions are null8. 
 
An equivalent statement for condition iii) will become useful later9: 
 
 
P P(long-short)     =    V (g2; m2; t2 ; s )   /   V(g1; m1; t1 ; l )   >   1 
 
P P(short-long)     =    V (g1; m1; t1 ; s )   /   V(g2; m2; t2 ; l )   >   1 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, definition 1 deserves two further 
qualifications, one linked with the concept of substitution, the other with 
the arbitrage process itself:   
 
a)  Whereas non-financial arbitrage always requires of an asset g1 (or 
two close substitutes, g1 and g2) to be mispriced, financial arbitrage takes 
place within a much more encompassing setting. In fact, to what extent 
can we regard two financial assets as close substitutes? A sensible 
approach qualifies two assets or portfolios to be substitutes if the following 
features hold outright: 
 
- their stream of expected future cash flows makes them 
indistinguishable from each other, 
 
- some relevant measure of risk, when applied to both stream 
of cash flows puts them into the same risky category10. 
 
It is when the foregoing remarks are carried on to their full swing that 
financial economists will regard such assets as equivalent and following 
the law of one price11. A trading-off between expected return and some 
risk measure underpins the substitution issue12.   
 
b) We can also perform arbitrage successfully by selling the asset at a 
certain moment, waiting for a while, and purchasing it later at a lower 
price. If we have the asset, that means opening a short position. If we do 
not, we open a short-selling position, a procedure seldom used in financial 
                                                 
8 In real practice, it is enough to ask for a negligible level of risk, even in a model so-
constrained as the standard one. 
9 Mainly in definition 3 and through section 4. 
10 More background on cash flows valuation in Ross (1978), and Elton-Gruber (1995) 
comes in handy for financial assets and portfolios.  
11 Froot et al. (1995) review the performance of the law of one price over 700 years, while 
Rogoff (1996) deals with the purchasing power parity puzzle. On the other hand, Isard 
(1977) remains a classic on the topic. 
12 By all means, this is a key issue, of which more details will follow in section 2.   5 
markets since there are many restrictions to the activity, albeit short-selling 
comes up as a crucial assumption in many Financial Economics models13 
and classroom settings. 
 
In financial environments, risk can only sparingly be dispensed with, and 
we say that in such cases a pure arbitrage is under way. But coping with 
risk is just a fact of life in capital markets. Moreover, whenever the 
purchase of a security at date t 1 involves its selling at a later date t 2, the 
arbitrage is risky, because at the starting point we do not know the value 
   
V (g2; s2; t2 ) 
 
that the underlying financial asset g2 will have at date t 2 – unless  we held 
some assets like zero-coupon bonds or had eventually hedged our 
position with derivatives. 
 
1.1  SHORTCOMINGS IN THE STANDARD FINANCIAL  
ARBITRAGE MODEL: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
It is hardly surprising that intensive research has been undertaken to 
uncover drawbacks of such oversimplified world like the one depicted in 
the standard financial arbitrage model. On this side of empirical research, 
let us highlight some contributions worthy of record and comment. 
 
a) In practice, arbitrageurs are able to draw up arbitrage opportunities 
through the exchange of substitutes that convey a legal right to acquire or 
dispose of, and conversely an obligation to provide or accept, securities 
identical with an existing one under known terms and contracts. Henderson 
and Martine (1986) studied this issue, mainly through the following examples:  
 
o Asset substitutes by risk grades, term to maturity, coupons, duration 
and convexity. 
o Convertible bonds and new issues of ordinary shares. 
o Options and futures. 
o ADRs and US Treasury Strips. 
o Risk arbitrage: by opening positions in stock from companies in the 
threshold of mergers or acquisitions, to profit later arbitraging 
between them.     
 
                                                 
13 The fact is that in many countries such mechanism is forbidden. But dealers can attain 
similar outcomes by carrying out repos and reverses so as to synthesize short-selling 
positions (an introductory grounding in Blake, 2000).   6 
b) In real-life environments, it is very difficult to carry out a complete 
arbitrage with financial assets, because of quantities, terms to maturity, 
regulations, marginal accounts balances linked with leverage and short-
selling positions, as it was proved by Larkman (1986).  
 
c) Bralsford (1986), working with both currencies and interest rate swaps, 
highlights some facts that enhance discrepancies between prices and 
returns, namely mismatching of regulations, foreign exchange policies, 
minimal sizes required for any trade. That is to say, the sort of features that 
hinge upon market microstructure.   
 
d)  Metcalf (1990) has done econometric research on departures from 
pure arbitrage. In the United States, there is a tax exemption granted to 
municipal and state bonds that has allowed municipal and state 
governments to profit from arbitrage opportunities in a consistent and 
lasting way. Accordingly, they issue tax-exempted bonds at a rate r(m) and 
invest the proceeds at taxable rate r(t). This is a clear example of how much 
influential microstructure, transaction costs and creative accounting could 
become in the capital markets. Although the practice is illegal, the Internal 
Revenue Service has not been able to prevent state and local governments 
from earning arbitrage windfalls. Even the so-called Gram-Rudman-Hollings 
Law (that deals with balanced budgets) has proved very difficult of being 
enforced. In fact, Metcalf singles out two kinds of arbitrage: 
 
o Financial Arbitrage: like the one above-mentioned. 
 
o Savings Arbitrage: by raising taxes to invest the proceedings in 
securities with higher returns. The interest from investments is paid to 
taxpayers under the guise of lower taxes expected in the future. 
 
e) There is an interesting case of the law of one price violation in the 
bonds market, provided in an empirical research by Daves y Ehrhardt 
(1993). Interest coupons and principal coupons are not perfect substitutes, 
since when reconstructing them after the moment they had entered the 
market as strips, there is a positive differential in favor of the principal 
coupon. By the same token, they are not equivalent as regards liquidity 
concerns. Dealers rebuild the bond and sell it a higher price than the one 
they could get by adding up the prices of single coupons. Furthermore, the 
spread at the selling side is not the same as the spread at the buying side; in 
general, it is higher. 
 
f)  As it was argued by Shleifer and Summers (1990), arbitrage is risky and 
therefore limited. This approach helps to explain available and noteworthy 
anomalies in the efficient markets model, and also key patterns of market   7 
behavior such as trading volumes and actual investment strategies. They 
singled out two types of economic agents in the capital markets, namely 
arbitrageurs (also labeled smart money, rational speculators) and noise 
traders (liquidity traders, irrational agents)14. The former are exceedingly 
proficient in building-up portfolios on fully rational expectations about 
financial assets returns. The latter, on the contrary, are subject to systematic 
biases, acting on psychological impulse (noise). It is for the arbitrageurs to 
bring prices towards fundamentals. Ultimately, two types of risk actually limit 
arbitrage in real markets: 
 
o Fundamental risk: selling short to repurchase later at a lower price 
may fail whenever expectations on that asset improve; that is to say, 
prices may never revert to fundamental values eventually. 
 
o Unpredictability of the future resale price: at the time of liquidating his 
position in the future, the arbitrageur would bear the risk for the asset 
of being overpriced. This type of risk is financial by nature because, 
even if prices converge to fundamentals, the path could be 
uncertain and bumpy.  
 
Although risk makes arbitrage ineffective, pervasive constraints in actual 
arbitrage are also to be found in the imperfect knowledge about 
fundamental values, and even in the ability to detect price changes that 
reflect deviations from fundamentals. That is to say, there are problems 
with mispricing identifications as well as with the risk of betting against 
them. News alone does not fully explain price changes, because 
uninformed changes in demand also have a word along the process. 
Finally, capital requirements mean that money cannot be indefinitely raised, 
neither costlessly nor unfettered by regulations. 
 
g) Whenever both investors and securities are subject to differential 
taxation, there might be a lack of referential prices to rule out tax 
arbitrage (Dammon and Green,1987).      We should bear in mind that in 
ideal modelsThe existence of “no-tax-arbitrage” prices ensures the 
existence of equilibrium prices. Identical securities that contribute to 
taxable income to different degrees will, in general, be valued differently 
and equilibrium will fail to exist unless short-sale restrictions are imposed 
that prevent investors from exploiting such arbitrage opportunities.  
 
                                                 
14 In spite of the labels, they are both rational actors. In the case of liquidity traders, their 
rationality is contestant of the one on the side of arbitrageurs. They have adversarial 
information sets, and take advantage of asymmetric information [a development 
around these topics in Apreda (2001a)]   8 
h) Mitchell and Pulvino (2000) followed a sample of 4,750 stock-swap 
and cash mergers, cash mergers and cash tender offers during 1963 – 1998, 
so as to single out the risk and return in risk arbitrage processes, finding out 
excess returns of 4 % per year. The risk arbitrage came out from the 
difference between the target’s stock price and the offer price, that is to 
say, a distinctive arbitrage spread.  Those results suggest that financial 
markets exhibit systematic inefficiency in the pricing of firms involved in 
mergers and acquisitions. 
  
i)   Arbitrage is very active between spot and future markets, with 
offsetting positions so that the law of one price holds. In the real world, 
however, mispricings are not infrequent and market frictions prevent 
arbitrage from taking place. Kempf (2001) did research on short-selling 
restrictions and early unwinding opportunities. He found out a major impact 
on the mispricing behaviour, mainly on index arbitrage trading by using the 
German stock index DAX and the DAX futures. The paper showed that 
 
o arbitrageurs faced trading and holding costs, and market impact 
costs as well; 
 
o there was a  pervasive influence of asymmetric holding costs and 
early unwinding. 
 
j)  Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2001) studied hindrances to arbitrage 
in equity markets between 1985 and 2000, any time when the market value 
of a company is less than the sum of its publicly traded parts. There were 
arbitrage opportunities, they persisted, and prices did not converge to 
fundamental values. Moreover, in 82 situations they found out that cross 
holdings had brought about this environment in which transaction costs 
stemmed from imperfect information and actual trades.    
  
k) The late 1990s wave of mergers and acquisitions was intended to 
consolidate industries. It can be explained as a response to market 
misvaluation of potential acquirers, potential targets and their 
combinations (Shleifer and Vishny, 2001). This approach sees managers as 
completely rational, conversant with market inefficiencies, and ready to 
arbitrage to their profit. 
 
l) The activity of arbitrageurs impact prices, and they back their 
trading with their own capital (capital adequacies for trading books of 
banks and securities firms, the margin levels imposed by clearing brokers, 
margins on futures and on leveraged equity accounts). On this issue, Attari 
and Mello (2001), conclude that “persistent price deviations occur and 
then they are the result of arbitrageurs being financially constrained.”   9 
m) With costly arbitrage and active noise traders, assets prices will be 
at variance of fundamental values, as Gemmill and Thomas (2002) proved 
in connection with a huge number of closed-end funds, which performed 
with an average discount to fundamental values in the long run, mainly 
because managers set high charges eventually. 
 
 
2. THE STANDARD COVERED INTEREST ARBITRAGE MODEL 
 
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that we make an educated 
guess that it is in the foreign market where a chance may arise for 
grabbing up a good net trading profit.  
 
Stage 1  There is a local alternative to consider by which, at 
valuation date t, we buy a security in the domestic market. Let us assume 
that it is a term deposit with maturity at T, when we will sell the security at 
that date15. 
 
Formally, if we plan to invest V(t, $) dollars in the local market D, at an 
annual nominal rate of interest equal to TNA D, then the effective rate of 
interest for the horizon [t ; T] is given by16 
 
r D  (t, T)  =  TNA D . (T - - t) / Year-basis D 
 
Therefore, the final value V(T, $, D) in dollars will be 
 
V(t, $, D) . [  1  +  r D  ( t, T ) ]   =  V(T, $, D) 
 
Stage 2  On the other hand, there is also a path of action that 
involves buying the term deposit in a foreign market. Let us imagine, for 
the sake of argument, that we choose London. If we were to follow this 
choice, we should firstly purchase pounds, at valuation date t. Let us 
assume that at that date, the selling quotation for pounds17 provided by a 
forex dealer is 
                                                 
15 In point of fact, when we make a term deposit we buy it spot from an authorized bank 
and, at the same moment, we sell it forward to the issuing bank. This round-trip exchange 
involved in the process is a plain swap of cash-flow positions. 
16 In most markets the year-basis equals 360 days, although in some others 365 is a 
frequent input. We are assuming that the same year-basis convention is used in both 
markets. Otherwise, an easy adjustment would give us the equivalent rate of interest that 
matches our target.   
17 “Offer” or “asked” are here used as synonyms. Besides, the “direct quotation” format is 
the one we use. That is to say, the quotation that tells us how many units in our own 





t            T 
 
V(t, $, D)        V(T, $, D) 
 
 

















We buy foreign currency so as to get   We sell foreign currency so as to get 
       
V(t, $, D) / FX(t, $/£, a)  = V(t, £, F)   V(T, £, F) . FX(T, $/£, b)  = V(T, $, F) 
        




V(t, £, F) . [ 1 + r F ]  = V(T, $, F) 
 
 
V(t, £, F)         V(T, $, F) 
 
 
t   FOREIGN MARKET      T 
          
   
 




Arbitrage in favor of the foreign market will 
directly proceed, if it holds 
 
V(T, $, D)    <    V(T, $, F) 
   11 
FX (t, $ / £, a) 
 
that means how many dollars we need to buy from the broker a unit of 
pound sterling.  
 
Hence, our starting capital in dollars could be translated to pounds the 
following way: 
 
V(t, $, D) / FX (t, $ / £, a) 
 
We intend to illustrate through Exhibit 1the standard case for a covered 
arbitrage of interest rates between a domestic and a foreign market, from 
which we could make a riskless benefit18.  
 
Stage 3  After buying the currency, we proceed to purchase the 
security issued in the foreign market, matching the same class of risk and 
maturity that conveys the one we could have chosen in the domestic 
market. 
 
If the foreign money market is offering for term deposits an annual 
nominal rate of interest equal to TNA F, then the effective rate of interest 
for the investment horizon will be 
  
r F  (t, T)  =  TNA F . (T - - t) / Year-basis F 
 
At maturity, the amount of foreign currency brought about by the deposit 
adds up to19 
 
[ V(t, $, D) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  . [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ]  =  V(T, £, F ) 
 
Stage 4  Lastly, we should sell this foreign currency. This leads to 
two distinctive settings: either we wait till maturity to sell, or we cover our 
ex ante position with some derivative, mainly through a forward contract 
to sell the foreign currency. As ours is an ex ante decision-making process, 
we proceed to cover.  
 
                                                 
18 An earlier attempt to handle this issue is to be found in Frankel-Levich (1973); for a 
unified approach to covered arbitrage of interest rates, see Apreda (1993). An excellent 
outline of arbitrage and speculation with financial assets can be read in Blake (2000). 
From another line of analysis, Spraos (1959) provides a helpful development about 
speculation and arbitrage with foreign currency.   
19 Bear in mind that D or F should be stressed as we did in the expressions above, since 
we could do a transaction in dollars outside the United States. One thing is the currency 
adopted as benchmark, quite another the market where we are going to use it.    12 
Hence, at date t the buying quotation for future dollars to sell at date T is 
given by20 
 
FX (T, $ / £, b) 
 
therefore, the amount to collect in dollars will be equivalent  to  
 
[ V(t, $, D) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  . [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ] . FX (T, $ / £, b)  = 
 
=   V(T, $, F) 
 
Stage 5  The decision-making process to invest the money in any 
of these markets is very simple. We are going to agree that the best 
market is the one that offers the higher amount of money to us.  
 
For instance, the foreign market will be more profitable whenever it holds 
that 
 
V(t, $, D) . [  1  +  r D  ( t, T ) ]   <   
 
<    [ V(t, $, D) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  . [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ] . FX (T, $ / £, b) 
 
Stage 6  As we can see, V(t, $, D) can be left out from both sides 
of the inequality, so as to get 
 
 [ 1 +  r D  ( t, T ) ]  <   
 
<    [  FX (T, $ / £, b) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  . [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ]   
 
Now, if we give heed to the first expression within square brackets on the 
right side of the latter inequality, we realize that it entails a return to be 
reaped for holding pounds (at t we purchase the currency, and after 
holding it along the horizon, we sell it at T, and this amount to a swap of 
cash flow positions in currencies, dollars-to-pounds-to-dollars). This return is 
usually denoted as the swap return, r SWAP.  All in all, 
 
[  FX (T, $ / £, b) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  =  [  1  +  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ] 
 
In conclusion, and by running stages 1 through 6, we have already 
proved the following statement. 
 
                                                 
20 If no coverage is achieved, we might have written this quotation as E[ FX (T, $ / £, b) ]. 
   13 
Lemma 1 For a profitable arbitrage in the foreign market, it 
must hold that: 
 
[  1  +  r D  ( t, T ) ]   <   [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ] 
 
Otherwise, the domestic market will provide the arbitrage opportunity. 
 
Once the arbitrage opportunity fades away, it is said that the market 
becomes arbitraged; in such an extreme case, the outcome turns out to 
be 
 
[  1  +  r D  ( t, T ) ]   =   [  1  +  r F  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ] 
 
which is usually known as covered-interest arbitrage (or parity theorem)21. 
 
Finally, and for the sake of clarity, it’s worth giving heed to the source of 
the swap return. To begin with, we should wonder about the nature of the 
expected return arising from the process of purchasing, holding and 
selling foreign currency. When we handle foreign currency that way, it 
amounts to the holding of any financial asset, which usually provide a 
return that can be broken down into a holding return on the one hand, 
and a financial return22 on the other hand. The latter component is missing 
with currencies; therefore, they provide a holding return, positive or 
negative, as a matter of course.  
 
If we firstly recall how to work out the return of any financial asset, next we 
could attempt to assess the return of holding currencies. By the rate of 
return r(t, T), for certain financial asset and throughout a planned 
investment horizon H = [t ; T], is meant the following expression: 
 
r(t, T)  =  [ V(T)  - - V(t)  +  I(t, T)  ] /  V(t) 
 
where V(T) stands for the value of the asset at date T, V(t) for the one at 
date t, I(t, T) for any cash flow to reward the investor under the guise of 
interest, dividends, and the like.  
 
In dealing with foreign currency, the equation above turns out to be 
 
                                                 
21 More on this topic can be followed in Blake (2000), in particular the international Fisher 
effect and the purchasing power parity. A related article in the New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Money and Finance proves to be useful to practitioners.  
22 Often, this is conveyed through payment of interest, dividends or the like to the 
investor, who had bought any asset in the financial market, from where it derives the 
label of “financial asset”.    14 
 r SWAP (t, T)  =  [FX (T, $ / £, b)   - -  FX (t, $ / £, a)]  /  FX (t, $ / £, a)] 
 
that is equivalent to  
 
[  1  +  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ]   =   [  FX (T, $ / £, b) / FX (t, $ / £, a) ]  
  
2.1 DRIVING FORCES AND CONSTRAINTS BEHIND REAL MARKETS 
 
The standard model of covered interest arbitrage disregards the actual 
constraints behind real markets.  It is true that the dynamics provided by 
supply and demand, on the one hand, and the adjustment process 
provided by arbitrage, on the other, point to real market forces. But this 
only entails a first level of understanding for the market dynamics; indeed, 
this seems to be the standard approach arising from the neoclassical 
standpoint, of which Lemma 1 is a direct heir.  
 
As a matter of fact, a second level of understanding for the market 
dynamics, and a deeper one by all intents and purposes, tracks down the 
underpinnings of forces that the first level has rather neglected, namely 
the institutional arrangements [rules of the game, distinctive laws and 
regulations, law enforcement and transparency]; transaction costs [on 
which we are going to expand further in section 3.1]; different 
endowment of information claimed by economic agents [asymmetric 
information]; opportunistic behavior, and the essential role intermediaries 
perform in the markets23. By choosing such level of research and analysis, 
we take advantage of a positive approach we have called 




3. TRANSACTIONAL ALGEBRAS24 
 
We are going to introduce the toolbox required to handle our proposal, 
namely differential rates, residual information sets, arbitrage gaps, 
transactional algebras and enlarged transaction costs.  
 
3.1 Differential Rates and Residual Information Sets 
 
For the time being, let us assume that the information set25 claimed by a 
decision-maker k at date t 
                                                 
23 We have dealt with this issue in depth elsewhere (Apreda, 2001). 
24 To the extent of our knowledge, the expression “transactional algebra” was firstly 
coined in Apreda (2003).    15 
W W( t ; k ) 
 
allows him to handle a rate of return linked to any distinctive economic 
variable26 that comes defined along the investment horizon H = [ t ; T ], 
contingent upon such information set. If we could assess another 
information set  W W 1 ( t ; k ) such that it would hold 
 
W W 1 ( t ; k )   Í Í   W W( t ; k ) 
 
and which would explain reasonably well the value of a rate of return 
 
r 1 ( t, T, W W 1 ( t ; k ) ) 
 
then, we could also attempt to measure up for how much of the starting 
rate value it still remains unexplained by this new one27. 
 
This is the logic behind the complementary notions of differential rates of 
return and residual information sets. We are going to provide a simplified 
definition of both concepts, but good enough for the purposes of this 
paper. But the reader should keep in mind that when we try to deal with 
more than two differential rates and residual information sets, the 
mathematics of the subject become more intricate and we have to deal 
with algebras of sets, a complete development of which was provided 
elsewhere (Apreda, 2000a, 2004).  
 
Definition 2  Differential Rates and Residual Information Sets 
 
The rate of return g( . ) that solves the following equation 
[ 1  +  r( t, T, W W( t ; k ) ) ]  =   
 
=  [ 1 +  r 1 ( t, T, W W 1 ( t ; k ) ) ] .  [ 1  + g( t, T,  W W R ( t ; k ) ) ] 
  
is called the differential rate of r( . ) given r 1 ( . ) , whereas the underlying 
information set for this rate 
                                                                                                                                            
25 That is to say, all the information available to the decision-maker. Whereas the 
conventional models assume all the economic actors share the same information 
(symmetric information), as from the 70s the stress is laid upon different endowments of 
information (asymmetric information). 
26 It could be, for instance, either a price, a rate of return, or the value of a certain 
market index. 
27 In the case of a financial asset, we mean here the rate of return of that financial asset. 
But there are other natural examples, as in the foreign exchange market when dealing 
with the appreciation or depreciation of the foreign currency against the domestic one. 
Also we could point to the rate that measures the change undergone by certain index.    16 
 
W W R ( t ; k ) 
 gets the label of residual. 
 
3.2 Arbitrage Gaps 
 
At this juncture, I introduce a concept that will help us to keep the further 
discussion within operational bounds28. We are speaking about the 
arbitrage gap, which intends to measure up the expected return from an 




By Arbitrage Gap is meant the rate of return brought about either in long-




1  +   r(arbitrage; long-short)   =   V (g2; m2; t2 ; s )  / V(g1; m1; t1 ; l ) 
 
1   +  r(arbitrage; short-long)    =    V (g1; m1; t1 ; s )  /  V(g2; m2; t2 ; l ) 
 
 
For any arbitrage to be successful both rates must be positive. The 
problem arises when the transaction costs and microstructure features of 
the market are not taken into account, therefore preventing the 
economic agent from eventually seizing the arbitrage opportunity. 
 
3.3 Transactional Algebras 
 
The concept of a transactional algebra summons not only a framework 
for the analysis of financial trading, including arbitrage processes within an 
institutional context, but also two matching tools: firstly, a suitable 
transaction costs function and, secondly, the concept of residual 




By a Transactional Algebra it is meant a complex structure whose 
distinctive features are: 
 
                                                 
28 Actually, it has been introduced implicitly when, after definition 1, a remark was made 
about condition iii of such definition.    17 
i)  Existence of one or more markets where financial assets can 
be traded either in public or private settings. 
 
ii)  The institutional framework and the market microstructure are 
set up by means of 
 
- trading and regulatory institutions; 
- intermediaries, investors, and regulators; 
- enforceable laws and rules of the game; 
- contractual arrangements about the property rights 
attached to each    transaction. 
 
iii) A total transaction costs function is explicitly given29 which 
includes all relevant and computable enlarged transaction costs. 
  
iv) The metrics for this structure comes out of differential rates, 
which are conditional upon their respective residual information sets 
    
3.4 Enlarged transaction costs: 
the costs of running transactional algebras 
 
Transaction costs have been usually neglected for decades. Even worse, 
as it is stated in some quarters, most transaction costs would become 
negligible as communication devices improve. To say the least, this belief 
is misplaced because transaction costs are the costs of running nothing 
less than a transactional algebra, as next remarks intend to bring to light: 
 
· Firstly, what it is customarily meant by transaction costs points only 
at some particular types of trading costs, mainly linked with 
purchasing and selling securities. Although in some markets trading 
costs are being curbed, in other places they are not. The sensible 
question to elicit is about the structure of those trading costs, which 
is not so simple as it seems at first sight. 
  
· Secondly, enlarged transaction costs encompass a broad variety of 
items30, which refer to manifold sources of distinctive costs:  
 
- intermediation (INT), which stem from the actual trading stages of 
purchasing or selling financial assets; 
  
                                                 
29 Section 3.4 labors this issue in length. 
30 More background on this subject can be found in Apreda (2000a, 2004).   18 
- microstructure (MICR), which stand for those costs stemming from 
market regulations, dealers trading arrangements to meet their 
intermediary roles; and restrictions on capital movements;  
 
- information (INF), which involves the search of all kinds of 
information needed by investors and dealers; also the costs of 
drafting, implementing, monitoring and improving the underlying 
contracts to enforce transactions (Flood et al., 1998); 
  
- taxes (TAX); 
  
- financial costs (FIN) associated with the purchase, selling or 
holding securities or foreign currencies.  
 
Although these five categories are neither exhaustive nor the only ones to 
work out, we believe that they pave the way for a sensible assessment of 
the transaction costs rate denoted by31 
 
TC ( t 1 ; t 2 ; m 1 ; m 2 ; x) 
 
which is a construct with the following features: 
 
a. it comes by the side of every single transaction; 
 
b. it amounts to a rate of change that may be expressed in 
percentage points; 
 
c. and it may be framed out of the functional relationship 
provided by a multiplicative model: 
 
< 1 +  TC(t, T, W WTC t ) >  =  < 1 + int(t ,T, W WINT t )  > . < 1  +  micr(t, T,  W WMICR t ) > . 
 
. < 1  +  tax(t, T, W WTAX t ) > . < 1  +  inf(t, T, W WINF t )  > . < 1 +  fin(t, T, W WFIN t ) > 
 
with the restriction   
 
W W k t     Í Í   W W TC t     for  k :  int, micr, inf, fin, tax 
 
                                                 
31 In the format that follows, a vectorial frame is used by which t1 and t2 stand for starting 
and maturity dates for the transaction; m1 and m2 for the markets in which the involved 
transactions can be carried out at those dates; x for long or short position at the current 
date. It goes without saying that if we worked out costs at the starting date and in 
certain market, we should drop the remaining date and market, as we are going to do 
below.   19 
Bearing in mind definition 4, we can see that the transaction cost rate 
gives account not only of any distinctive cost to be attributed to 
transactions and trades, but also their contractual costs and those that 
arise from underlying institutional settings. In fact, the role and essence of 
intermediation can be explained out of transaction costs (Benston and 
Smith, 1976). 
 
We are interested here in applying this functional relationship to arbitrage 




short position:  1   + TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; s )      = 
 
[ 1 – int(s) ] . [ 1 – micr(s) ] . [ 1 – tax(s) ] . [ 1 – inf(s) ] . [ 1 – fin(s) ] 
 
long position:   1   + TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; l )      =   
 
[ 1 + int(s) ] . [ 1 + micr(s) ] . [ 1 + tax(s) ] . [ 1 + inf(s) ] . [ 1 + fin(s) ] 
 
When selling, costs lessen the cash flows to be finally collected. When 
purchasing, they add to incurring outflows33. 
 
Before concluding this section, we need to take a step further and embed 
each transaction cost rate pertaining the short and long position into a 
comprehensive differential rate that might account for the costs of 




In a transactional algebra environment, let us denote with 
  
diff TC (long-short) 
 
                                                 
32 See footnote 20. 
33 Although decision-making in (1) requires an ex ante setting, we leave out the 
expectations operator symbol, E[ . ], for ease of notation. Each component has its own 
functional structure, which does not come up as linear, necessarily. In fact, non-linearity is 
customary and useful in latest research, which take advantage of piece-wise linear 
functions, or still better, the so-called simple or step functions, so as to approximate more 
complex relationships. [For instance, Levy-Livingston (1995) on portfolio management; 
Day (1997) in nonlinear dynamics applied to economics; Apreda (1999) on chaotic 
patterns for the arbitrage gap in capital markets]  
   20 
the differential transaction costs rate that solves the equation  
 
1  +  diff TC(long-short)   = 
 
=  [ 1  +  TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; s ) ]  /  [ 1  +   TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; l ) ] 
 
In other words, the differential transaction costs rate measures up the 
whole impact of the costs of running the transactional algebra involved 
with an arbitrage. It will prove functional to the main statements 
conveyed by Lemmas 2 and 3, which are going to be proved in next 
section.   
 
By the same token, if the transaction is of the type short-long, the equation 
in the definition should become  
 
1  +  diff TC(short-long)   = 
 
=  [ 1  +  TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; l ) ]  /  [ 1  +   TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; s ) ] 
 
 
4.  ARBITRAGE WITHIN TRANSACTIONAL ALGEBRAS 
 
Rates of return can be broken down into the cost components on the one 
hand, and a return netted from them, on the other hand. Two lemmas are 
needed to cope with this matter.  
 
Lemma 2 In a transactional algebra, and for every arbitrage 
opportunity, it holds true that: 
 
i) there is an arbitrage return net of transaction costs. 
 
ii) there are diferential rates to translate each type of 




Using (1), the money to collect when selling the asset (all-in-cost basis) 
would amount to 
 
V( s ) . [ 1 – int(s) ] . [ 1 – micr(s) ] . [ 1 – tax(s) ] . [ 1 – inf(s) ] . [ 1 – fin(s) ]   = 
 
=   V( s ) .  [ 1  +  TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; s ) ]     
 
and when purchasing the asset (all-in-cost basis):   21 
 
V( l ) . [ 1  +  int(l) ] . [ 1  +  micr(l) ] . [ 1  +  tax(l) ] . [ 1 +  inf(l) ] . [ 1  + fin(l) ]  
= 
 
=   V( l ) . [ 1   +     TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; l ) ] 
 
The return from this arbitrage yields (either trading or financial, and in 
nominal terms) follows from  
 
V(s)  /  V(l)     =    1   +   r(arbitrage) 
 
When taking into account transaction costs arising from the rounding-off 
exchanges we can put forth the equation 
(2) 
  
V(s) .  [ 1 + TC ( t 2; m 2; s ) ]  /  V( l ) . [ 1 +  TC ( t 1; m 1; l ) ]  = 
 
=    1   +   r net  (arbitrage) 
 
and solving for r net  (arbitrage) we ultimately have a measure of the return 
in an arbitrage process that embodies transaction costs.   
 
Furthermore, by resorting to definition 5, the differential transaction costs 
rate follows from 
 
1  +  diff TC(long-short)   = 
 
=   [ 1  +  TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; s ) ]  /  [ 1  +   TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; l ) ] 
 
therefore, the relationship (2) can now be rewritten in a much more 
compact format: 
 
   [ V(s)  /  V( l ) ] . [ 1   +  diff TC(long-short) ]   =   1  +   r net  (arbitrage) 
 
and, last of all, we get 
 
  [ 1 +  r(arbitrage) ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(long-short) ]   =   1  +   r net  (arbitrage) 
 
ii) Let us substitute now the labels t k  (k: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) for the enlarged 
transaction costs labels trad, micr, tax, inf, and fin, respectively. Then,  
 
1 + g k   =  [ 1  - - t k (s) ]  /  [ 1  +  t k  (l)  ] 
 
where g k performs as a differential rate drawn out of t k (s) and t k  (l) .   22 
On the other hand, we can replace in (1) to get the equivalence: 
 
1  + diff TC(long-short)     =      [  Õ Õ  ( 1 + g k )  ] 
 
=  [ 1  +   TC ( t 2 ; m 2 ; s ) ]  /  [ 1  +  TC ( t 1 ; m 1 ; l ) ]      [ END ] 
 
Whereas in the standard financial arbitrage model arbitrage opportunities 
can be grabbed once the conditions of definition 1 are met, in a 
transactional algebra structure this cannot be warranted. In fact, 
arbitrage will only be feasible if the arbitrage gap overrides the constraints 
of the transactional algebra, as the following lemma makes clear. 
 
 
Lemma 3 In a transactional algebra, the fulfillment of the standard 
financial arbitrage conditions does not grant that an 
arbitrage opportunity remains profitable.  
Proof: 
 
Whenever an investor takes advantage of arbitrage opportunities, he tries 
to lock in a sure profit that follows from definition 3:  
 
 
1 + r(arbitrage; long-short)    =   V(g2; m2; t2 ; s )  /  V(g1; m1; t1 ; l )    
 
1 + r(arbitrage; short-long)    =   V(g1; m1; t1 ; s )  /  V(g1; m2; t2 ; l ) 
 
Let us analyze each relationship at a turn. 
 
a)  the long-short type of arbitrage 
 
If we included transaction costs, according with Lemma 1, we would get 
a net arbitrage return: 
 
  1   +   r net  (arbitrage)  =   [ 1 +  r(arbitrage) ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(long-short) ]      
 
For the arbitrage to become successful, it must hold: 
 
[ 1  + r (arbitrage; long-short) ]  =    
 
=   [ V (g2; m2; t2 ; s )  /  V(g1; m1; t1 ; l ) ]   >  1 
 
but this is not a sufficient feature, because differential transaction costs 
could lead to  
   23 
1 + rnet (arbitrage; long-short)  =   
 
=  [ 1 +  r(arbitrage); long-short ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(long-short) ])   <  1 
 
thus yielding a negative return on the net rate of return for the arbitrage. 
 
 b) the short-long type of arbitrage 
 
By the same procedure as in a) we would get that is not enough the 
fulfillment of  
 
[ V (g1; m1; t1 ; s )  /  V(g2; m2; t2 ; l ) ]   >  1 
 
because the transaction costs structure could bring about the following 
outcome: 
 
1 + rnet (arbitrage; short-long)  =  
 
=   [ 1 +  r(arbitrage); short-long ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(short-long) ]   <  1 
 
giving forth a negative return on the net rate of return for the arbitrage.   [ 
END ] 
 
It is from Lemma 2 that we can frame a definition of what is meant by 





Financial Arbitrage within a transactional algebra is a decision making 
process whose main features are: 
 
i.    the trade of a financial asset g 1, at an expected moment t 1, in a 
certain market m 1, at the value  V(g1; m1; t1 ) ; 
 
ii.    the trade of a financial asset  g 2, at an expected moment t 2, in a 
certain market m 2, at the value V (g2; m2; t2 ), with t 1  £ £  t 2  ;  
 
iii.    making a sure profit from round-off transactions with g1 and g2, 
either the long-short or the short-long types, that is to say, the payoff 
functions  P P( . ) are positive: 
 
                                                 
34 See footnotes 7 and 8.   24 
P P(long-short)   =  1 + r(arbitrage; long-short)  =  
 
=  V(g2; m2; t2 ; s )  /  V(g1; m1; t1 ; l )   > 1    
 
P P(short-long)  =   1 + r(arbitrage; short-long)   =     
 
=  V(g1; m1; t1 ; s )  /  V(g1; m2; t2 ; l ) > 1 
 
iv.    no investment is required for setting up both transactions;  
 
v.    risks of rounding off both transactions are null. 
 
vi. it meets the following boundary conditions 
 
1 + rnet (arbitrage; long-short)  =  
 
=   [ 1 +  r(arbitrage); long-short ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(long-short) ]     >  1 
 
1 + rnet (arbitrage; short-long)  =  
 
=   [ 1 +  r(arbitrage); short-long ] . [ 1  +  diff TC(short-long) ]     >  1 
 
 
5. COVERED INTEREST ARBITRAGE  
WITHIN A TRANSACTIONAL ALGEBRA 
 
Henceforth, I assume that the trade of financial assets and currency will 
proceed between a domestic and a foreign market within the context of 
a transactional algebra. It’s worth giving heed to what this fact actually 
amounts to, by noticing the following remarkable issues: 
 
a) There is, on the one hand, an institutional setting consisting of the 
rules of the game (laws, regulations and conventions) as well as 
exchange arrangements. On the other hand, there are watchdogs 
that make for the fairness of the whole game (Central Banks and 
Securities Exchange Commissions). 
 
b) Investors, dealers, brokers and international banks, work out 
transaction cost functions35. 
 
                                                 
35 Although this may be done either approximately or as an educated guess, the key 
point is that transaction costs are embedded in the entirety of the analysis.      25 
c) Asymmetric information is the name of the game, and hand in 
hand with this feature, we may face opportunistic behavior with 
guile on the side of the players.  
 
d) Lemma 1 amounts to a valid statement in a world of perfect 
competition and symmetric information, with a boundless arbitrage 
activity. Therefore, it should be only regarded as a benchmark that 
provides technical and helpful approximations. 
 
e) Broadly speaking, Lemma 2 holds by and large, granting that 
arbitrage opportunities are meaningful only when transactions costs 
are embedded in the analysis, and become translated as 
differential rates. 
 
f) Lemma 3 also holds by and large, pledging that arbitrage 
opportunities as discovered by applying Lemma 1 might not 
ultimately lead to net profits eventually. 
 
Being this the last section of this chapter, let us move on to give due 
regard to transaction costs, stemming both from the foreign exchange 
markets and the securities markets. 
 
However, we know that enlarged transaction costs must also include 
those arising from the market microstructure, the financing of positions in 
foreign currency, taxes and information costs. With such a broad 
viewpoint, we are going to trace the round-trip involved with this 
arbitrage process.  
   
Domestic securities market:    When buying, holding and selling a security 
in the domestic market, the return can be 
broken down into a net rate of return, and 
a differential rate  
 
g D  ( t, T ) 
 
that stands for transaction costs. Hence: 
(3) 
[  1  +  r D  ( t, T ) ]     =   [  1  +  net  r D  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  g D  ( t, T ) ] 
 
Foreign securities market By the same token, when buying, holding 
and selling a security in the security market, 
we get 
 
(4)   26 
 [  1  +  r F ( t, T ) ]     =   [  1  +  net  r F  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  g F  ( t, T ) ] 
 
Foreign exchange markets Last of all, buying foreign currency, holding 
it under the guise of a security, and selling 
it eventually, leads to a return 
decomposable in a net rate of return and 
a differential rate of transaction costs   
(5) 
[  1  +  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ]     =   [  1  +  net  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  g SWAP  ( t, T ) ] 
 




Lemma 4 In a transactional algebra, and conditional upon an 
information set W Wt,, covered interest arbitrage against 
the domestic exchange in favor of the foreign 
exchange requires the fulfillment of the following 
inequality: 
 
[ 1 + net r D  ( t, T ) ]  <   
 
<   [ 1 +  net r F  ( t, T ) ] . [ 1 + net r SWAP  ( t, T ) ] . [ 1 + g( t, T ) ]  
 
where g( t, T ) translates the round-trip transaction costs gap. 
 
Proof: By plugging (3), (4) and (5) into the main outcome of lemma 1, the 
arbitrage will be granted in favor of the foreign market whenever it holds: 
 
[  1  +  net  r D  ( t, T ) ]  .  [  1  +  g D  ( t, T ) ]  < 
   
<  [ 1  +  net  r F  ( t, T ) ] . [ 1  +  g F  ( t, T ) ] .  
 
. [ 1  +  net  r SWAP  ( t, T ) ] . [ 1  +  g SWAP  ( t, T ) ] 
 
if we build up the round-trip transaction costs gap this way 
 
[ 1 + g( t, T ) ]   =   
 
=   {  [ 1  +  g F  ( t, T ) ] . [ 1  +  g SWAP  ( t, T ) ]  }   /  [  1  +  g D  ( t, T ) ]   
 
we could grant that the foreign market is better, even when we take 
transaction costs into account.  If the transaction costs gap does not   27 
meet the latter inequality, then it will mean that the arbitrage is not 





Although the standard financial arbitrage model and the covered-interest 
arbitrage’s proposition provide an extreme framework of analysis, they 
have proved more of a hindrance than a help in real financial markets. 
 
In line with the new theoretical and empirical viewpoints that have 
evolved in Financial Economics since the 70s, this chapter puts forth a 
proposal to overcome the constraints of the standard models by means 
of the notion of Transactional Algebra, which is a construct that adds to 
arbitrage the institutions that rule the markets, also the transaction costs 
structure that stems from such setting, and a new toolbox to address these 
issues, namely differential rates, residual information sets, arbitrage gaps 
and the differential transaction cost rate. 
 
The main outcome of this chapter sets up the conditions to be fulfilled in 
order to successfully carry out an arbitrage with foreign currencies in a 
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